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Preface and Acknowledgments
In 1945 few grasped the extent of the destruction of Eastern Euro-
pean Jews and their civilization, and the implications of this loss for 
the region. Among the first who mourned the loss were the Jewish 
survivors and eyewitnesses, as illustrated by the poem “Untitled 1” 
of the January 1945 Novyi mir cycle by the Russian Jewish poet Ilya 
Ehrenburg:
I used to live in cities grand
And love the company of the living,
But now I must dig up graves . . .
In fields and valleys of oblivion
I speak for the dead. We shall rise,
Rattling our bones—we’ll go—there,
Where cities, battered but still alive,
Mix bread and perfumes in the air.
Blow out the candles. Drop all the flags.
We’ve come to you, not we—but graves.
(Translation copyright © 2011 Maxim D. Shrayer)
 The Holocaust has become the European paradigm of lieu de 
mémoire and the universal icon of evil. Some have claimed the Holo-
caust an international paradigm of human rights. These developments 
have evolved in different directions, creating on the one hand greater 
understanding of the impact of the Holocaust, and on the other, poor 
analogies and competing narratives of martyrdom. In Europe, despite 
the establishment of the International Day of Holocaust Remem-
brance (27 January), the memory of the Holocaust still creates tensions 
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between the West and Europe’s postcommunist countries. In the lat-
ter, memories of the Gulag and reluctance to come to terms with the 
dark wartime past, particularly as it relates to local Jewish communi-
ties, play a significant role in the ways the Holocaust is remembered.
 This book aims to capture the reception and interpretation of the 
Holocaust in all the postcommunist countries. It examines the various 
stages, motivations, and nature of this dynamic process. Even as this 
book was being completed, the postcommunist region witnessed new 
developments in the memorialization of the Holocaust. For example, 
in Skopje, Macedonia, the Balkan Holocaust Museum opened, and 
in Poland a new debate erupted over Jan Tomasz Gross’s latest book, 
Golden Harvest. This volume records all the important developments 
through the two decades since the collapse of communism and, we 
hope, it delineates the key aspects, commonalities, and divergences of 
the memory of the Holocaust in the region.
 We would like to express our appreciation to a number of institu-
tions and individuals that enabled us to work on this project. John-
Paul Himka would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada and the Center for Advanced Holocaust 
Studies at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Joanna 
Beata Michlic is particularly grateful to Prof. Shulamit Reinharz of 
the Hadassah Brandeis Institute, Brandeis University, for her sup-
port and to Prof. Yehuda Bauer for his beneficial comments. We are 
also deeply indebted to Mr. Sigmund Rolat, the Conference Claims 
Commission, and the Holocaust Educational Trust for their generos-
ity. We would like to thank all our contributors, and especially Omer 
Bartov for his exhaustive afterword.
 Finally, we would like to thank our editors at University of Nebraska 
Press for their care, support, and interest in this project, and the anon-
ymous readers for the press who offered an invaluable critique. Last 
but not least, we would like to thank our families and friends for their 
patience and support.
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Introduction
Engaging with the “Dark Past”
In the last two decades the subject of memory has become a com-
pelling preoccupation of sociologists, historians, public intellectu-
als, and artists. The French scholar Henry Rousso has pointed out 
that “memory has become a value reflecting the spirit of our time.”1 
We live in the era of memory and delayed remembering of traumatic 
experiences, and it is accompanied by two interwoven developments—
the cultures of apology and of repentance.2 Jeffrey Olick, an Amer-
ican scholar of public memory, has referred to this phenomenon as 
an “increase of redress claims” and a “politics of victimisation and 
regret.”3 The “politics of regret” has emerged simultaneously with 
the rise of multiculturalism and the transformation, in the West, of 
the meaning of the Holocaust from a crime empirically committed by 
Germans, Austrians, and other Europeans against the Jews to a par-
adigm for innocent suffering and victimhood.4
 A difficult but important aspect of the study of memory is that of 
“the dark past” of nations in relation to their ethnic, religious, and 
national minorities—the ways in which nations recollect and rework 
the memory of their “dark pasts” and how this memory shapes their 
collective identities and the social identity of ethnic and national 
minorities. Discussions about national identities cannot escape from 
an orientation toward the past, especially the uncomfortable past, 
which does not pass away.5 The memory of the Holocaust and the 
Jewish past in postcommunist Eastern Europe fits into this category 
of empirical problems. It is an exceptionally interesting case for the 
study of the painful process of coming to terms with “the dark past” 
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on the one hand, and on the other hand, of getting the past wrong, 
thus making both the past and present not only bearable but also 
predominantly positive and “bright.” It demonstrates that in main-
stream historical consciousness and public memory the painstakingly 
“uncovered” accounts of the “dark” pasts are chiefly perceived in a 
category of “too much truth” that can hardly be accepted on a larger 
social scale. And it shows too that in public memory, remembering is 
not necessarily about getting the past right, but rather about main-
taining the positive collective self-image and soothing national myths. 
Thus, “the dark past” is perceived as a spoiler.
 The memory of the Holocaust and the Jewish past in postcommunist 
Europe also has manifold practical implications for the development 
of national cultures and international relationships in postcommunist 
Europe, as well as for international relationships between the post-
communist countries and Israel and the Jewish diaspora, and between 
the postcommunist countries and the United States.
 We had each been working on the problematic memory of the 
dark past when we decided to put together this volume. Joanna had 
already coedited a book with Antony Polonsky about the debates over 
the massacre of Jews at Jedwabne on 10 July 1940 in Poland and had 
just finished her monograph Poland’s Threatening Other, which dealt 
with Polish images of Jews from the 1880s until the early twenty-first 
century.6 John-Paul was near the beginning of a research project on 
Ukrainians and the Holocaust in history and memory and was work-
ing out some of his ideas about Ukrainian Holocaust memory at con-
ferences. We realized that we were working on problems that exhibited 
many striking similarities. We also read with interest the work of other 
scholars on how the Holocaust was being remembered (or forgotten) 
in the Central and Eastern European countries making the transition 
out of communism. It would be very fruitful, we thought, to bring 
together a collection of interpretive surveys of the struggle with the 
memory of the Shoah in every postcommunist country in Europe, 
addressing a wide array of developments throughout the region.
The Memory of the Dark Past in West and East
The cohesiveness of the collection is based upon a certain unity of his-
torical experience in postcommunist Europe. In Western Europe and 
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North America, the memory of the destruction of European Jewry 
has been alive since the late 1960s and early 1970s. There is no need 
to recapitulate all the moments in the development of the memory of 
the Holocaust in the noncommunist West, but they include the cap-
ture, trial, and execution of Adolph Eichmann (1960–62), the airing of 
the television miniseries The Holocaust in the United States and Ger-
many (1978–79), the release of the blockbuster film Schindler’s List 
directed by Steven Spielberg (1993), and the opening of the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum in the center of Washington dc 
(also 1993). In fact, during the thirty years preceding the collapse of 
communism in Europe, the Holocaust had evolved in the West into 
the most potent, easily recognizable, and ubiquitous symbol of mass 
murder and genocide. It was regularly appropriated by groups other 
than Jews to make points about their own sufferings. It became a 
source of reflection for philosophers like Hannah Arendt, sociologists 
like Zygmunt Bauman, and historians like Raul Hilberg.7 It brought 
into question all the accomplishments of Western Enlightenment—
how did such great evil emerge from a civilization so proud of its 
moral and intellectual achievements? The Holocaust came to occupy 
a centerstage position in ethical thinking about the modern world. It 
was to stand as an example of the dangerous consequences of racial 
and ethnic prejudice and hatred: “Never again!”
 Oddly, or perhaps not so oddly, this intense focus on the Holocaust 
occurred in societies that were more removed from the actual histor-
ical event. No Holocaust occurred, of course, in the United States, 
Canada, or Britain. The Jews of Nazi-occupied Western Europe, even 
of Nazi Germany and Austria, were generally murdered outside West-
ern Europe, in the death and concentrations camps in the East. Lucy 
Dawidowicz’s widely used estimate of Jews killed in various countries 
in the Final Solution shows that victims from countries that entered 
the postwar era as capitalist numbered fewer than half a million; how-
ever, Jews killed in European countries that were communist after the 
war totaled almost five and a half million.8
 It was certainly easier to think about the Holocaust in places where 
it was more abstract, though in Western Europe the Jewish victims 
were not publicly acknowledged either during the two decades after 
the war.9 But it was much harder to do so in societies where the mas-
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sive machinery of genocide had actually been let loose, taking not 
only victims but also accomplices. The messiness of actual historical 
experience made it difficult to imagine clarity. For example, while the 
West could more easily distinguish among neat categories of victims, 
perpetrators, and bystanders, the East had difficulty making sense of 
the tangled complexities—victims forced to act as perpetrators (Jew-
ish Ordnungsdienst were the largest manpower component in many 
ghetto roundups), perpetrators as rescuers (those who had the power 
to kill also had the power to save), selfless rescuers who exceeded the 
call of moral duty and rescuers who became perpetrators against their 
Jewish charges, and bystanders who had no sidelines to flee to.10
 Another difference between the West and the East was the inten-
sity of the experience of Nazi occupation. Occupied France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Italy did not experience anything like the ter-
ror that raged in occupied Poland, the Soviet Union, or Yugoslavia. In 
the latter region, the Germans mass murdered intelligentsia, burned 
innumerable villages to the ground, deported millions to Germany as 
forced labor, starved over three million Soviet pows to death, and rou-
tinely shot large numbers of the population as hostages or suspected 
resisters. For the West, clearly, the Holocaust, once it reentered mem-
ory in the late 1960s, stood out more boldly from the background of 
wartime violence than it did in the East.11
The Dark Past in the Communist Era
This more diffuse suffering from the Nazi occupation allowed the 
communist regimes—perhaps even induced the communist regimes, 
since their motivations remain uncertain—to downplay the specific-
ity of Jewish suffering during the war. That is, the regimes did not 
acknowledge that the Jews as a nationality were singled out by the 
Germans for total extermination. Although the Soviet Union, the 
Eastern European satellite states, and Yugoslavia did not entirely pro-
hibit discourse about the Holocaust, they muffled it and dissolved it 
into the narrative of how all the people of their state suffered from 
the fascist invaders. In the communist interpretation of the Second 
World War, there was no room for public mourning and empathy for 
the dead Jews and the destroyed world of Eastern European Jewish 
civilization with its various centers such as Vilnius, the “Jerusalem 
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of the North”; Lublin, the “Jerusalem of the East”; and Sarajevo, the 
“Jerusalem of the Balkans.” As a result, and also because of tight cen-
sorship of the press in these countries, there was insufficient thrash-
ing out of locals’ complicity in the Holocaust. True, former policemen 
and camp guards in German service were arrested and sentenced to 
years of exile or the death penalty, but these trials were not the sub-
ject of public discourse, nor were the ramifications of political and 
social collaboration in the Holocaust articulated and incorporated 
into historical consciousness and social memory.12 Also insufficiently 
aired was the legacy of interwar and wartime anti-Semitism; in fact, 
at various moments in postwar communism, the regimes themselves 
manipulated and reemployed the old anti-Semitic attitudes and tropes 
for their own purposes. Although, and indeed because, wartime col-
laborationist regimes—like those of Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, 
and Croatia—were anathematized by the communists, anticommu-
nist and nationalist intellectuals privately viewed these regimes with 
less hostility, sometimes with favor. The same was true for wartime 
nationalists in places like Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Lithuania.
 At the same time, Jewish communities in the communist coun-
tries experienced more alienation from the surrounding society as a 
result of their experience with the Holocaust in the first place and the 
absence of recognition of their special suffering in the second place. 
Whatever they felt, it was not possible for them to articulate it out-
side the family and immediate community. Within the remaining 
local Jewish communities, the Holocaust survivors acted as the chief 
organizers of low-key Holocaust commemorations and, at the same 
time, represented the only sympathetic audience for these commem-
orative events.13 In the spirit of bearing witness, they felt compelled 
to write—in a censored press of limited circulation and for a numer-
ically limited audience—about the lost vibrant Jewish world and its 
destruction.
 In 1994 the anthropologist Rubie S. Watson contended that the 
socialist states failed to convince society of their interpretation of 
the past, and as a result, alternative “underground memories” always 
existed and were kept alive.14 This contention holds true with respect 
to the public memory of the precommunist and communist pasts of 
the majority group, understood in an ethnic sense. However, in the 
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case of the troubling, painful relations with Jews and other minori-
ties during the war, “underground memory” was not alive among the 
majority groups, except for a few individuals, as chapters in this book 
confirm. In fact, as argued by Michael Steinlauf in a pioneering study 
of the memory of the Holocaust in Poland, the official communist way 
of dealing with the memory of the Holocaust reflected, ultimately, a 
popular need.15 It was socially acceptable and accepted.
 Only after the fall of communism did the deeply buried memories 
of the Holocaust resurface among eyewitnesses who as children and 
young adults had had a firsthand experience of the local killing fields 
and who had after the war kept these troubling memories from dis-
turbing their everyday conscience. But by the early twenty-first cen-
tury these individuals slowly began to speak out about the wartime 
horrors that they witnessed, as oral history projects and interviews 
conducted in the region in that period confirm.16 Correspondingly, 
Jewish survivors, who had previously drawn a veil of silence over 
their wartime experiences and their Jewish background, have begun 
to articulate their past traumas and trajectories of survival.
The Outburst of Competing and Discordant Memories
When communism collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in the 
Soviet Union in 1991, coming to terms with the Holocaust was one 
of the political, moral, and cultural challenges that encumbered post-
communist Europe’s “return” to Europe. If the citizens of the post-
communist bloc aspired to the new European values, then they were 
obliged to adopt the thinking about the Holocaust that prevailed in 
Stockholm and New York, London and Brussels. In the initial eupho-
ria of the “end of history,” the difficulties with reconciling the two 
Europes’ understanding of the Holocaust did not seem to loom large. 
But as time passed, it became clearer that postcommunist Europe was 
not finding it so easy to accept the Western model of the Holocaust; in 
fact, there was considerable resistance, often taking on similar forms 
in different countries.
 In Eastern Europe, the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s 
witnessed what the historian Padraic Kenney calls a “carnival of rev-
olution.”17 Remarkably peaceful in Central Europe but violent in 
the Balkans, the carnival was marked by an explosion of memories 
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from both the precommunist and communist pasts. As a result, many 
skeletons from national closets have been exposed to daylight for 
the first time since 1945. The restoration of memory has not been a 
smooth, unifying, or unified process.18 And at present it is still under-
going many dynamic transformations of competing and discordant 
remembering.
 So far we can differentiate two major stages of the process of resto-
ration of memory. This is central to understanding how the national 
communities—the political and cultural elites as well as ordinary 
members of societies—have related to, remembered, and commemo-
rated the Holocaust throughout the postcommunist period. It is also 
essential to understanding the continuities and discontinuities of the 
major narratives about the Holocaust and Jews that emerged prior to 
and during this time, and the continuing redesigning, refashioning, 
and reconceptualizing of these narratives.
 The first phase, which occurred immediately after the fall of com-
munism, took on an (ethno)nationalist form. A powerful dichotomy 
of “we” the nation and “they” the communist regime was strongly 
emphasized at the expense of a more nuanced representation of the 
past. The “ethnic vision” of the past, excluding the memory of the 
local Jewish communities and other minorities, was prevalent. More-
over, the memory of the Holocaust continued to be repressed in public 
discourse, and defensive attitudes toward the difficult past in relation 
to the destruction of the Jews played a more significant role in pub-
lic discourse than the newly emerged narratives aiming at exposing 
the dark past. At the same time, a new wave of recycled and modi-
fied nationalistic and anti-Semitic narratives about the Jews as per-
petrators during the communist period (Judeocommunism) have also 
(re)emerged. The theme of Judeocommunism, in its various versions, 
is the key narrative in the repertoire of the right-wing ethnonation-
alist politicians, journalists, and historians in the Baltic states, Hun-
gary, Romania, Poland, and Ukraine. It serves to justify and minimize 
any wrongdoing against the Jews during the Holocaust and to rein-
force the narrative of one’s own victimhood during World War II and 
in the post-1945 communist period. A good illustration of the still-
potent nature of Judeocommunism is that even some Eastern Euro-
pean historians and public intellectuals, such as Krzysztof Jasiewicz, 
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who had previously opposed the stereotype of Judeocommunism as a 
false anti-Semitic construct, have changed their tune in the course of 
the first decade of the twenty-first century and have begun to advo-
cate Judeocommunism as a historical fact. Such individuals reside not 
only in their countries of origins but also in the West. As the chapters 
in this book confirm, commemorative sites such as the newly estab-
lished museums of national suffering under communism in the Baltic 
states and Hungary have evoked Judeocommunism in their presenta-
tions of the past.
Arrival of “Dark Pasts” in Eastern Europe
The second phase of restoration of memory gradually crystallized 
by the late 1990s and the first years of the new millennium. It can 
be called progressive, pluralistic, and civic because it aims at endors-
ing the complex, painful memory of the Holocaust. The key charac-
teristic of this phase is the increasing awareness that national history 
is more complex than a black-and-white vision opposing the com-
munist version of the past. During this phase, new information and 
new interpretations of the past, previously ignored both under com-
munism and in émigré circles, have entered public discourse. And it 
is during this phase that the dark, discomforting past of the majority 
nations’ treatment of Jewish communities during the Holocaust has 
become a subject of historical awareness, history writing, artistic per-
formances, and public discourse. The impetus to the development of 
this phase springs from two different current cultural and political 
factors that intersect. The first is the emergence of the genuine cul-
ture of nostalgia for the multiethnic past in some sections of society, 
accompanied by interests in “all things Jewish” and the emergence of 
what the acclaimed writer Ruth Ellen Gruber has called “Virtual Jew-
ish Culture.”19 On a smaller, local scale, this process has even led to 
the emergence of “the self-proclaimed carriers of the lost East-Euro-
pean Jewish civilisation.”20 An example is Janusz Makuch, director of 
the highly successful annual international Jewish festival in Kraków.21
 The second factor is the pragmatic realization that the Holocaust 
has become the contemporary European entry ticket, as discerningly 
observed by the late Tony Judt in Postwar.22 As a result, the countries 
that already joined the European Union in May 2004 and some of 
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those that are awaiting admission have discovered that it is far better 
politically to commemorate the Holocaust than to ignore it and that 
it is more profitable commercially to celebrate the multiethnic past 
than to deny it. Politicians of these countries recognize that endors-
ing multiculturalism is a means of gaining respectability and visi-
ble international status in the West. Therefore, their new, endorsed 
reconceptualizations of Jews and the Holocaust tend to perceive “the 
perished Jews as good citizens and Jewish survivors and their descen-
dents living in the West as welcome visitors.”23 On occasion, however, 
state officials utter pronouncements that contradict the new stance on 
Jews, as various speeches of Romanian and Baltic state representatives 
have demonstrated.
 Contemporary Poland best illustrates a postcommunist country 
in which the second phase of restored memory has reached the most 
sophisticated level, as demonstrated during and after the Jedwabne 
debate, whereas Ukraine best illustrates a postcommunist country 
in which the first phase of restored memory still has the upper hand. 
Only with great difficulty is the second civic phase trying to establish 
itself in public discourse and history writing in Ukraine. As Anatolii 
Podolsky, director of the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Research in 
Kyiv, sharply summarizes, “remembrance culture has reached a dead 
end,” since there is “no desire to accept the ‘other’ as well.”24
 Looking at the discourse about the Holocaust in most postcommu-
nist countries, one is inclined to argue that all still await their respec-
tive “Jedwabne debates.” Such a debate would place the Holocaust and 
the most difficult aspects of the relations with the Jewish minority 
at the center of public discourse and would also pose salient ques-
tions about a contemporary national identity and the status of vari-
ous ethnic and national minorities in the past and present. “Jedwabne 
debates” are necessary triggers of national conversations about the 
present and future of society, “who we are,” “who we want to be,” and 
“how we relate to the ‘Other.’” Yet they do not necessarily make the 
nation tell its past anew. In Poland of the post-Jedwabne era, groups 
of politicians, historians, public intellectuals, journalists, artists, and 
society at large are clearly split in how they understand and evaluate 
the dark aspects of Polish relations with the Jews during the Holo-
caust. The version of the dark past still acceptable for a broader pub-
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lic claims that only a small minority of Polish society did wrong to the 
Jews. And social and cultural resistance to integrating the painful dark 
past into public memory and popular historical consciousness con-
tinues, despite impressive historical research by Polish historians in 
Poland and abroad and fact-based sophisticated Holocaust educational 
programs implemented in Polish high schools after 2000. This resis-
tance indicates, then, that the split over the dark past could become 
a fixed landmark of the process of memorialization of Jews and the 
Holocaust in Poland as well as in other postcommunist countries.
 Moreover, we can differentiate three key dimensions recurring in 
the landscape of memory of Jews and the Holocaust: remembering 
to remember, remembering to benefit, and remembering to forget. 
Remembering to remember is a process that underscores the void left 
after the genocide of local Jewish communities. The intention is to 
mourn, to commemorate the loss, and to come to terms with the dark 
aspects of relations with the Jewish minority by making this past an 
integral part of national history, historical consciousness, and public 
memory. The advocates of this dimension insist on not only integrat-
ing the history of Jews and other ethnic and national minorities into 
national history but also treating the Jews and members of other eth-
nic and cultural minorities as members of the nation in a civic sense. 
On a cultural level, their major goal is to create both a “community of 
identification” with and an empathic memory for the Other. And thus 
they are engaged in building a forward-looking, open, and inclusive 
society based on the civic model of national belonging and a respect 
for multiculturalism and for humanitarian values.
 In remembering to benefit, the key intention behind recalling and 
commemorating the Jews and the Holocaust is to achieve tangible 
goals on the individual, regional, and national level. Here the focus 
is not so much on the past per se or on an identification with and 
empathic memory for the Other, but rather on utilizing the past in 
the pursuit of tangible benefits such as an elevated status and respect-
ability in the international arena. With regard to the history of the 
Jews in their nation, they emphasize that the Jewish minority has long 
been present and that the descendents of this minority living abroad 
are today welcome to become part of and to invest in the new post-
communist entity. They posit that Israeli and Western Diaspora Jews 
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should view the country of their ancestors with a completely fresh 
eye. They insist on treating the present moment in history as a “zero 
point” in forging new and mutually beneficial relationships with the 
Jews in the West and in Israel. Though they acknowledge the dark 
past in the history of their nation, for them that past is a completely 
closed chapter on which one should not dwell, but instead look to the 
future. In the name of this “bright” future, they claim it is better to 
concentrate on those chapters in the history of the majority nation’s 
relations with the Jews that cast a good light, rather than on the dark 
history of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.
 In remembering to forget, the dark past is seen as an unjust insult 
on collective history, memory, and identity.25 This perception pro-
vokes an upsurge of anti-Jewish prejudices expressed either overtly 
or covertly. Here, the interest in the Jewish past and the Holocaust is 
greeted with tension and is disdainfully referred to as “an imported 
fashion for Jews.” The advocates of “remembering to forget” view the 
painful dark past as an unjust insult on national history and memory 
and as a threat to the nation’s identity and future, and therefore they 
attack advocates of “remembering to remember.” In “remembering 
to forget,” the archeology of the dark and uncomfortable past pro-
vokes an upsurge of old anti-Jewish prejudices and stereotypes, care-
fully modified and repackaged to suit particular current political and 
social situations, and depending on the particular disseminators, the 
new/old anti-Jewish messages are delivered either overtly or covertly.
 What remains certain is that by closely watching the developments 
of restored memory in postcommunist countries, especially contem-
porary encounters with the Holocaust, we can learn a great deal about 
the dynamics of public (collective) memory and national identity in 
the region. We learn the dynamics of the reconceptualization of the 
Jewish past and the Holocaust and the limits of recognition and inte-
gration of the dark past by broad, multigenerational sections of post-
communist societies.
 The chapters in this book also confirm that the process of dig-
ging out and uncovering the “dark past” has raised fears of “criti-
cal (national) history” because it is a rather novel approach to history 
writing in Eastern Europe. Looking at the ways the dark past is inte-
grated or not integrated illuminates the legacy of the formerly dom-
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inant model of history writing, namely the “monumental (national) 
history” that underscores the “positive past” and its “heroes,” and the 
contemporary tensions between the “monumental history” and “crit-
ical history” models. We learn from these tensions how professional 
historians approach the problem of historical truth, and how they are 
being constrained, as members of a particular national community, 
by fears of so-called negative nationalism.
About This Book
Chapters are ordered alphabetically by country, representing every 
postcommunist country except Montenegro and Kosovo, which are 
discussed briefly in the article on Serbia. This is not a collection of 
conference or workshop papers, although early drafts of some of the 
papers were presented at meetings of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Slavic Studies.
 The relative unity of the situation of the postcommunist recep-
tion of the Holocaust contributes to the cohesiveness of this volume. 
Even so, we established a chapter structure for each contribution to 
follow, making it easy for readers to compare particular themes across 
countries. We asked contributors to provide a historical introduction 
that would briefly describe the general wartime situation and espe-
cially the relation of the majority nation to the Jews, including issues 
of collaboration and rescue, and then briefly discuss the memory of 
the Holocaust under communism. Main topics of lieux de mémoire to 
be covered are the memory of the Holocaust and “high politics”26 and 
public debates over the event since 1989, the Holocaust in the educa-
tional system and scholarship, the Holocaust in various branches of 
culture (literature, cinema, music, theater), grassroots memorializa-
tion projects and commemorative sites, narratives of overseas dias-
poras, the thinking and activities of the Jewish communities of these 
countries, and Holocaust negationism and anti-Semitism. In the case 
of Hungary, we requested contributions from two authors, each with 
a different expertise.
 Many of our contributors have roots in the countries about which 
they write and belong to the younger generations of scholars. Their 
age reflects the fact that the unbiased study of the Holocaust in East-
ern Europe and its memory, free of the earlier hegemonic commu-
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nist narratives, is itself very young. These scholars do not shy away 
from writing frankly about emotionally charged and sensitive topics 
pertaining to national identity and the dark past. As editors, we had 
meaningful and enlightening discussions with our contributors and 
learned a great deal about the dynamics of the memory of the Holo-
caust in different countries of the region, but at the same time we can-
not take responsibility for their particular approaches, interpretations, 
and arguments. This volume presents a variety of interdisciplinary 
approaches to the subject within a structured framework of inquiry.
 Despite a growing body of literature dealing with the memory of 
the Holocaust, previous scholarly works on the topic have had certain 
shortcomings. Monographs have tended to look at a particular case 
and focus on official or public memory, while collections have pre-
sented an array of articles different in content, style, and methodol-
ogy. Our collectively authored book, however, aims to overcome the 
weaknesses of both monographs and collections, and is original in 
its emphasis on the comparative perspective, its range of cases under 
discussion, and its analysis of the same specific themes in each case. 
Our book illustrates the common processes at play and the reasons 
why investigation of the role of local elements in the wartime aban-
donment, mistreatment, and mass murder of the Jews has proceeded 
so unevenly, and why memory of this painful past constitutes a con-
tinuing challenge difficult to overcome. The concluding chapter by 
Omer Bartov brings the recurrent themes into sharp perspective.
 The main object of our book, having been partially inspired by 
István Rév’s important study Retroactive Justice, is the remake of the 
Holocaust and Jews in political, cultural, and socials realms in post-
communist countries since the fall of communism. The book focuses 
on the trajectories of this remake in light of the legacy of the dark 
past in relation to Jews; the earlier precommunist memories of Jews 
and communist memory (amnesia) of the dark past; current Western 
expectations and requirements for a full participation in European 
institutions, particularly the European Union; and cultural nostalgia, 
or its absence, for the multiethnic past. We concentrate on how this 
remake interplays with postcommunist discourse about national iden-
tity, democracy, the culture of pluralism, and civil, inclusive societies.
 This book is intended as a reference for scholars and students of 
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the Holocaust, of Eastern European history, politics, and culture, of 
modern Jewish history, and of the sociology of memory.
 We consider our book a potential departure point for comparative 
analysis of the ways in which memories of “the dark pasts” shape dis-
courses on democracy and national identity in Eastern Europe and 
elsewhere. Although memories of South America’s violent past have 
become the subject of intense inquiries, incorporating Latin America 
into the analysis is beyond the scope of the present study. Nor does 
our book directly discuss the (potential) encounters between current 
Western intellectual discourses and interpretations of the Holocaust 
presented by scholars such as Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, 
Michael Rothberg, or Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, and discussions 
about the Holocaust generated in postcommunist Europe.27 The ways 
in which Western thought influences postcommunist thinking about 
the Holocaust and the ways in which local traditions embedded in his-
tory and in the bestowed heritage dominate, and the interplay between 
the two, are a set of topics that deserves a separate study. Nor does this 
book compare Western and Eastern European trajectories of coming 
to terms with the dark past. We recognize that a study examining in 
systematic fashion Western and Eastern European models of emer-
gence from postwar amnesia concerning the fate of Jews during the 
Second World War in a broader historical context over a longue durée 
would be of great importance because it would illuminate differences 
and commonalities between Western and postcommunist Europe.
 Since every book has its physical limits, we also had to abstain from 
a direct and systematic analysis of recent pan-European initiatives to 
fight anti-Semitism and commemorate the Holocaust through various 
committees and organizations like the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe, the 
EU-funded Agency for Fundamental Rights, and the Task Force for 
International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, 
and Research (itf). But chapters in our book do touch upon the impact 
of transnational EU agendas on specific modes of remembrance in 
Eastern Europe, such as the increased interest in rescuers of Jews, 
which is especially pronounced in Albania and Poland, and attitudes 
toward Holocaust denial prior to the EU’s legislation of 2008 penal-
izing Holocaust denial.
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 Finally, our book does not discuss contemporary encounters of 
Eastern Europeans with Israelis and Jews of the Western Diaspora and 
how these encounters influence these groups’ memory of the Holo-
caust and the different roles the Holocaust plays in shaping contem-
porary Israeli identity. There is no doubt, as several chapters in this 
book show, that political transformation triggered a revival of Jewish 
life in Eastern Europe and that today the remaining, mostly numer-
ically insignificant Jewish communities of the region have a more 
assertive sense of Jewish identity and are highly engaged in memory 
projects and commemorations of the Holocaust. However, their reac-
tions to the trajectories of public debates about the dark past differ. 
They range from silence, disappointment, and fear, especially pro-
nounced in older generations of Holocaust survivors, to social activ-
ism in younger generations.
 In Israel, where almost every week the main daily newspapers 
Haaretz, Yediyot Ahronot, and Maariv still publish new wartime 
accounts of survivors from Eastern Europe, an emphasis is being 
placed on how the specific wartime events affect the lives of Israelis 
as Jews and individual human beings.28 At the same time there is also 
a realization of the disappearance of living witnesses to the dark past 
and an accompanying sense of orphanhood in the next generations, 
and the fragility of what Marianne Hirsch calls the postmemories of 
the post-Holocaust generations.29
Memory: Between Past and Future
The wealth of archival sources that have become available since the 
collapse of communism combined with new political, social, and cul-
tural developments have provided crucial insight into the trajectories 
of the memory of the Holocaust in postcommunist societies. In par-
ticular, this has facilitated a more nuanced and complex understand-
ing of the continuities and discontinuities of the representations of the 
Holocaust and the role it plays in contemporary national discourse in 
the region.
 By the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, most 
of the postcommunist states proclaimed an annual Holocaust Remem-
brance Day to observe as a national event. Some states, including 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Estonia, and Poland chose the date 27 
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January, the anniversary of the Red Army’s liberation of the Ausch-
witz-Birkenau death camp complex, as their national Day of Holo-
caust Remembrance; other states, including Lithuania and Latvia, 
chose a different date for the memorial day, one related to histori-
cal events in their own country.30 In general, decisions regarding how 
and where the Holocaust in a particular locality should be remem-
bered were determined not only by recognition of the event as worthy 
of memorialization but also by practical and instrumental concerns. 
The changes of governments during the postcommunist period have 
revealed that ideology plays a crucial role in the attitudes toward com-
memorations of the Holocaust. Ideology affects the status of com-
memorations in the public sphere in both subtle and bold ways, as 
various chapters in our book attest. For example, in 2002 in Hungary, 
which today has the largest Jewish community in Eastern Europe, the 
new right-wing government rushed to introduce a novel commemo-
rative date, “Memorial Day of the Victims of Communism,” to com-
pensate and balance the “Holocaust Memorial Day.”
 The official commitment to educate about the Holocaust has not 
yet been sufficiently incorporated into local textbooks or adequately 
implemented in curricula. This is the situation despite the signing 
by many postcommunist states of the Stockholm Declaration at the 
International Forum on the Holocaust in 2000. And some countries, 
including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belarus, Moldova, Slovakia, and 
Ukraine still lack sophisticated, unbiased educational programs about 
the genocide of European Jewry.
 Michael Schudson, an American sociologist, convincingly contends 
that memory is essentially social “because it is located . . . in a whole 
set of cultural practices through which people recognize a debt to 
the past and in collectively created monuments and markers.”31 Social 
memory always tells us more about the present than the past of the 
collective. The variegated postcommunist memories of the Holocaust 
confirm the correctness of this observation. For example, in both the 
Czech Republic and Albania, countries with different histories, cul-
tures, economies, and demographic compositions, we find a striking 
commonality in the overarching theme of “innocence” pertaining to 
the memory of the Holocaust. The belief in “collective innocence” 
underpins the interpretation of collective behavior during the Sec-
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ond World War and the current self-evaluation of society. Thus, Alba-
nians and Czechs believe that since they did not participate in the 
Holocaust, they therefore constitute an example of a community of 
tolerance and democracy that does not need to look critically at its 
past. In Albania there is also a strong belief that Albanians and Jews 
share a common history as persecuted nations throughout the modern 
era. In popular historical consciousness in Slovenia, Slovenes cultivate 
a notion of exceptionalism not dissimilar from the concept of “inno-
cence” with regard to the responsibilities of locals for the genocide of 
the tiny Slovene Jewish community.
 In the Balkans, a region too often and unjustly excluded from com-
parative studies of Eastern European memories of the Holocaust, the 
bloody wars in post-Yugoslavia in 1992–95 generated specific images 
of the Holocaust that the nationalists on all sides of the conflict manip-
ulated to advance their national, social, and political projects—most 
importantly, legitimized statehood. In this strategy, the Holocaust 
was completely divorced from its historical context and instead was 
turned into an effective tool in the propaganda war that accompanied 
the brutal conflict in the heart of Europe.
 In contested territories such as Macedonia and Moldova, the 
accounts of the fate of the Jews during the Holocaust have been manip-
ulated in a similar fashion in order to fulfill the national aspirations 
of conflicting parties. They typically present their versions of World 
War II and the Holocaust so as to portray their opponent in an unfa-
vorable light, especially by contrast to themselves. For example, Mol-
dovans who oppose the claim of the Romanian character of Moldova 
insist that the persecution of the Bessarabian Jews was introduced 
by the forces of the “Romanian occupiers,” while the pro-Romanian 
Moldovans often view any discourse about the local Holocaust as a 
strategy to undermine what they believe is the true, Romanian iden-
tity of the majority population of Moldova.
The Dark Past and the Double Genocide Theory
The Holocaust has no doubt arrived in postcommunist countries, but 
the temptation to tell the past in a comforting way, as Tony Judt cor-
rectly predicted, is persistent in the region.32 Perhaps out of this temp-
tation “the double genocide theory,” or the symmetry between Nazi 
Buy the Book
18 himka and michlic
and communist crimes, was born and is most pronounced in the Bal-
tic states. This theory makes a powerful tool in the hands of local 
right-wing ethnonationalists and might have a detrimental impact on 
the process of coming to terms with the dark past in those coun-
tries. Ethnonationalists employ this theory to minimize the wartime 
crimes against Jews and to undermine the discourse about legal, his-
torical, and moral responsibilities for the Holocaust. In their eyes, 
the Holocaust is a purely “exaggerated” historical event that basically 
obfuscates the suffering of other people.33 To reinforce their nega-
tive evaluation of the Holocaust, the radical ethnonationalists skill-
fully employ the above-mentioned potent theme of Judeocommunism. 
They also weave a refashioned theme of Israel as the present embodi-
ment of the Nazi state into the narrative of what they consider to be 
their own unacknowledged and forgotten suffering vis-à-vis the well-
known suffering of the Jews. Responsible criticisms of Israeli policies 
are valid, but the comparisons of Israel to the Nazi state are perverse, 
as noted most recently by Shlomo Avineri, a political scientist, Israeli 
statesman, and public intellectual, himself a critic of specific policies 
of the present Israeli government.34
 Putting on the mantle of martyrdom and mixing it with anti-
Semitic themes of Judeocommunism and “Nazi Israel” in order to 
undermine the memory of the Holocaust creates a highly volatile mix-
ture that could have a lasting effect not only on the integration of the 
dark past into mainstream historical consciousness but also on the 
memory of the Second World War in general.
 The Senate of the Czech Republic endorsed the theory of double 
genocide in a resolution of 3 June 2008, and the European Parliament 
passed a similar resolution on 2 April 2009. The latter declared 23 
August, the date on which in 1939 the infamous Ribbentrop-Molotov 
agreement was signed between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, 
as a date of remembrance of victims of both regimes. Yehuda Bauer, 
the eminent Israeli historian of the Holocaust, protested against the 
comparisons between Nazi Germany and the Soviet regime, argu-
ing that “World War II was started by Nazi Germany, not the Soviet 
Union, and the responsibility of the 35 million dead in Europe, 29 mil-
lion of them non-Jews, is that of Nazi Germany, not Stalin. To com-
memorate victims equally is a distortion.”35 As several chapters in this 
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book reveal, a minority of local public intellectuals also strongly pro-
tested this comparison. But perhaps one of the most adamant voices 
against political calls for the Soviet Union’s crimes against Lithua-
nia to be named an act of genocide is that of Lithuanian philosopher 
Leonidas Donskis. In his article “The Inflation of Genocide,” pub-
lished in June 2007 Donskis argues:
We are living in an era of not only monetary inflation, but also of the 
inflation—hence devaluation—of concepts and values. . . . After all, we 
cannot regard the history of all our civilisations as one ongoing crime 
and one endless genocide of some group or other. Whitewashing a con-
cept benefits no one. . . . No matter how cruel the Soviet terror that was 
visited upon the Baltic states, a large segment of Lithuanian, Latvian and 
Estonian society, by going over to the other side, by becoming collabo-
rators, was not only able to save itself, but also secure for itself success-
ful careers in the administration of the occupying regime. This group 
was able to wreak havoc on and settle scores with its own people, doing 
so with impunity.36
 We differentiate here between the manipulation of comparison in 
order to downplay the significance of the Holocaust, which is usually 
embarked upon precisely as a way to distract from a dark past of col-
laboration in the murder of the Jews, and legitimate scholarly com-
parisons that explore the deep wounds of twentieth-century history. 
Furthermore, our insistence in this volume on the importance of the 
genocide of the Jews is not intended in any way to diminish empathy 
for the suffering of others at the hands of the Nazis or of the Soviets 
during these evil times. We agree with Michael Shafir, whose bril-
liant analysis of the forms of postcommunist historical denial is cited 
many times by the authors in this volume, that “for the trivialization 
of the Holocaust to lose its largely East European prevalence, we . . . 
might well stop and ask whether we do not sin ourselves in trivializ-
ing other genocides.” And:
Comparisons, to be sure—including comparisons in the social sciences—
may be a scientific instrument serving the purpose of widening the per-
spective of analysis. There is no reason why the Holocaust should not be 
compared with the Gulag, were it only for the fact that they both undeni-
Buy the Book
20 himka and michlic
ably belong to the genocide phenomena, and genocide studies, alas, are an 
emerging discipline in our world. However, when the comparison is made 
for the purpose of denying or belittling either of them, and/or for that 
of obliterating that which is inherently unique to either the Holocaust or 
to the Gulag, then one has ceased to look for similarities and has entered 
the odious minefield of historic negation. Such endeavors have nothing in 
common with science, “social” as they may still remain.37
The Future of the Dark Past
In Triumph and Trauma, Bernhard Giesen observes that today in the 
West the Holocaust has acquired the position of “a free-floating myth 
or a cultural icon of horror and inhumanity.”38 But in postcommunist 
Eastern Europe, the approaches to the meanings of the Holocaust still 
have a rather more specific local character, embedded in wartime his-
tory, though Western influences are also visible. Characteristically, 
as many chapters in our book confirm, an acceptance of new rituals 
of remembering and commemorating the dark past usually provokes 
counter-rituals, and the “critical history” writing about the dark past 
provokes counter–“monumental history” writing. Remembering to 
remember, remembering to benefit, and remembering to forget—the 
three dimensions of remembering Jews and the Holocaust—continue 
to manifest themselves in different versions and with varied influence. 
Thus, it is impossible to speak about a rupture between the past and 
the present. Instead, one can observe a fusion of the past and the pres-
ent that also produces modifications of traditional narratives designed 
to suit current needs.
 The multitude of approaches toward Jews and the Holocaust and 
the painful dynamic of the dark past in postcommunist countries 
suggest that cultural heritage and traditions exert enduring power 
on national identity, memory, and professional history. On the other 
hand, major selective transformations in the realm of national mem-
ory, identity, and history are possible under new global conditions, 
Western/international demands and pressures, multiculturalism, and 
nostalgia for a multiethnic past. What is therefore certain is that the 
project of the integration of the memory of the Holocaust with all its 
painful and uncomfortable aspects will require intense work on the 
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part of more than one generation of scholars, public intellectuals, edu-
cators, and local enthusiasts in the region and its diasporas.
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